EVENT STUDIES IN SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS by Henninger, Samuel R.
787 
EVENT STUDIES IN  
SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS 
Samuel R. Henninger* 
If  you are interested in billions of  dollars in lost money,1 a 
conspiracy to mislead the public,2 and Dick Cheney,3 then this topic is for 
you.  In Part I, I discuss section 10(b) class actions.  In Part II, I discuss 
the Halliburton litigation.  In Part III, I discuss event studies. 
I. SECTION 10(B) CLASS ACTIONS 
On June 6, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 
Securities Exchange Act of  1934 into law.4  This law established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.5  Congress decided to regulate 
“transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets [because they] are effected with 
a national public interest.”6  To serve that purpose, it enacted section 
                                            
* Candidate for J.D., The University of  Tennessee College of  Law (2019); B.A., The 
University of  Tennessee (2016). The author will serve as a 2019–2020 Term Law Clerk 
for Chief  United States Bankruptcy Judge Marcia Phillips Parsons of  the Eastern District 
of  Tennessee following his graduation. In September 2020, he will join Waller Lansden 
Dortch & Davis, LLP as an Associate in the Finance & Restructuring Group. 
1 Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of  the Securities Exchange Act 
of  1934 at 4, Archdiocese of  Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 
3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Complaint] 
(subsequent history omitted). 
2 Id. at 2–3 (“This action arises out of  a scheme to manipulate and falsify Halliburton’s 
98-01 financial results and statements, including a series of  false and misleading 
statements that misrepresented the condition and success of  Halliburton’s business, 
including its construction operations, the benefits of  its acquisition of  Dresser, its 
exposure to asbestos liabilities, Halliburton’s financial condition and results of  operations 
and its future business and financial prospects.”). 
3 Id. at 2 (“[The individual defendants in the Halliburton litigation] operated under the 
leadership of  Richard Cheney, who became CEO/Chairman of  Halliburton in 8/95 and 
served as its CEO/Chairman until 7/00, when he left to run for Vice President – hailed 
on his departure as a successful corporate executive who had turned Halliburton around, 
reorganized its construction businesses, made a very successful acquisition, [and] led 
Halliburton to record profitability and positioned Halliburton to continue to achieve 
growing profits going forward.”). 
4 Securities Exchange Act of  1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)). 
5 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012). 
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10(b).7  This section prohibits the use of  “any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of  such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe.”8 
In 1942, to exercise its power under section 10(b), the Securities 
and Exchange Commission adopted rule 10b-5.9  This rule makes the 
following activity illegal: 
[A]ny person, directly or indirectly, by the use of  any means or 
instrumentality of  interstate commerce, or of  the mails or of  any facility 
of  any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of  a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of  the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of  business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of  any 
security.10 
A private plaintiff  may bring a damages action under this statute 
and rule.11  A securities fraud class action is an example of  a damages 
action that a private plaintiff  may bring under this statute and rule.12 
II. HALLIBURTON LITIGATION 
In 2002, the Erica P. John Fund and other plaintiffs filed a 
securities fraud class action against Halliburton.13  The plaintiffs purchased 
common stock of  Halliburton between June 3, 1999, and December 7, 
2001.14  They claimed that they suffered significant damages because of  
                                            
7 § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891. 
8 Id. 
9 Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of  Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (1994). 
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
11 See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
12 Id. at 339, 341. 
13 Ryan Holeywell, High Court Ruling Pleases Halliburton, HOUS. CHRON. (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/High-court-ruling-pleases-
Halliburton-5574124.php. 
14 Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
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“defendants’ scheme to defraud and the resulting artificial inflation in 
Halliburton’s stock price due to defendants’ financial falsifications and 
other misleading statements.”15  During the class period, Halliburton’s 
stock dropped from a high of  $56 per share to $10 per share.16  Plaintiffs 
alleged that the stock price fell because “defendants’ prior manipulations, 
misrepresentations and other fraudulent conduct were revealed.”17  The 
lawsuit was originally filed in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of  Texas, and it reached the United States Supreme 
Court twice.18 
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton I on June 6, 2011.19  Chief  
Justice John Roberts wrote the unanimous opinion.20  At the district court 
level, the lead plaintiff, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (EPJ Fund), defeated 
Halliburton’s motion to dismiss.21  Next, the district court found that the 
EPJ Fund’s proposed class under Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 23 met 
the requirement in section (a) but failed to meet the requirement in section 
(b)(3).22  To certify the EPJ Fund’s proposed class, the district court held 
that it needed to see evidence of  “‘loss causation with respect to any’ of  
its claims.”23 
The United States Court of  Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.24  It held that the district court properly refused to grant class 
                                            
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 4. 
17 Id. at 3–4. 
18 Nate Raymond, Halliburton Shareholder Class Action to Settle for $100 Million, REUTERS 
(Dec. 23, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-halliburton-lawsuit-
idUSKBN14C2BD. 
19 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011). 
20 Id. at 806. 
21 Id. at 807–08. 
22 Id. at 808. 
23 Id. “The elements of  a private securities fraud claim based on violations of  § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) 
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase 
or sale of  a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic 
loss; and (6) loss causation.” Id. at 809–10 (internal quotations omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
24 Id. at 809. 
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certification because the EPJ Fund failed to prove “that the corrected 
truth of  the former falsehoods actually caused the stock price to fall and 
resulted in the losses.”25  And to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits as 
to whether securities fraud plaintiffs must prove loss causation in order to 
obtain class certification,” the Supreme Court granted the EPJ Fund’s 
appeal from the Fifth Circuit.26 
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit “erred by requiring 
EPJ Fund to show loss causation as a condition of  obtaining class 
certification.”27  First, the issue addressed by the Supreme Court was 
whether the EPJ Fund met the requirements for class certification under 
Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 23(b): “that the questions of  law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”28  In a 
securities fraud action, a case such as this one, “[w]hether common 
questions of  law or fact predominate . . . often turns on the element of  
reliance.”29 
Second, the Supreme Court previously entitled plaintiffs in 
securities fraud actions to a rebuttable presumption that the element of  
reliance is met because of  the “fraud-on-the-market” theory.30  To get this 
rebuttable presumption, however, the EPJ Fund needed to prove the 
following: “that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known (else 
how would the market take them into account?), that the stock traded in 
an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took place ‘between 
the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was 
revealed.’”31  The next part is where the Supreme Court found an error in 
the Fifth Circuit’s logic.32 
The Fifth Circuit added an element that the EPJ Fund needed to 
prove at the certification stage: loss causation.33  The Supreme Court 
                                            
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 813. 
28 Id. at 809 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
29 Id. at 810. 
30 Id. at 811 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988)). 
31 Id. (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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found that that additional requirement was “not justified by Basic or its 
logic.”34  First, the Supreme Court never required a plaintiff  to prove loss 
causation to invoke the rebuttable presumption under Basic.35  Indeed, loss 
causation is never mentioned in the Basic opinion.36  Second, loss causation 
is simply different than reliance—leading to the conclusion that proving 
loss causation could not help to prove reliance.37  “The fact that a 
subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the revelation 
of  a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied 
on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively 
through the fraud-on-the-market theory.”38  In sum, the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of  the Fifth Circuit after concluding that it erred by 
placing the burden of  proving loss causation on the EPJ Fund at the 
certification state.39 
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton II on June 23, 2014.40  
Chief  Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion.41  After losing at 
the Supreme Court in Halliburton I on the issue of  loss causation, 
Halliburton argued on remand that it had rebutted the EPJ Fund’s reliance 
presumption “because the evidence it had earlier introduced to disprove 
loss causation also showed that none of  its alleged misrepresentations had 
actually affected its stock price.”42  But this time, the district court held in 
favor of  the EPJ Fund and certified its proposed class under Rule 
23(b)(3).43  In turn, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.44  And the Supreme Court 
granted Halliburton’s appeal from the Fifth Circuit.45 
                                            
34 Id. at 812. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 813. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 815. 
40 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
41 Id. at 2404–05. 
42 Id. at 2406. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 2407. 
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This time, the Supreme Court decided two issues: (1) whether the 
“presumption of  reliance for securities fraud claims that [it] adopted in 
Basic” should be overruled and (2) “whether securities fraud defendants 
may attempt to rebut the Basic presumption at the class certification stage 
with evidence of  a lack of  price impact.”46  First, the Supreme Court 
refused to overturn the reliance presumption under Basic because 
Halliburton failed to demonstrate a “special justification” for doing so.47  
Halliburton’s argument that “the Basic presumption contravenes 
congressional intent and has been undermined by subsequent 
developments in economic theory” failed to convince the Supreme Court 
to overturn the case.48 
Second, the Supreme Court considered whether “defendants 
should at least be allowed to defeat the presumption at the class 
certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in 
fact affect the stock price.”49  Halliburton sought to present the evidence 
not only at the merits stage but also at the class certification stage.50  And 
the Supreme Court ruled in Halliburton’s favor on this issue: “defendants 
must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to defeat the 
presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not 
actually affect the market price of  the stock.”51  One way to do so was 
described by the Supreme Court.52  Defendants may present “event 
studies—regression analyses that seek to show that the market price of  
the defendant’s stock tends to respond to pertinent publicly reported 
events.”53 
                                            
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)). 
48 Id. at 2408. 
49 Id. at 2414. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 2417. The parties ultimately “reached a $100 million settlement to resolve [the] 
long-running securities fraud class action lawsuit against the oilfield services provider that 
twice reached the U.S. Supreme Court.” Raymond, supra note 18. “Halliburton said the 
company itself  would pay $54 million of  the $100 million settlement, while its insurer 
would fund the rest.” Id. 
52 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415. 
53 Id. To measure the effect of  events on stock prices, “[f]inancial economists use event 
studies.” Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of  Event 
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (2018) (“The core contribution 
of  the event study is its ability to differentiate between price fluctuations that reflect the 
range of  typical variation for a security and a highly unusual price impact that often may 
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III. EVENT STUDIES 
A few months after the Supreme Court decided Halliburton II, 
Halliburton filed its event study at the district court level.54  The report 
was prepared by Lucy P. Allen, “a Senior Vice President of  NERA 
Economic Consulting (“NERA”) and member of  NERA’s Securities and 
Finance Practice.”55  She had “an A.B. from Stanford University, an M.B.A. 
with a concentration in Finance and Accounting from Yale University, and 
M.A. and M. Phil. degrees in Economics, also from Yale University.”56  
Before joining NERA, she served on the Council of  Economic Advisers 
for both President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton.57  At 
NERA, she served as a consultant and expert witness on issues of  
securities and financial economics.58  At the time of  the report, her hourly 
rate at NERA was $725 per hour.59 
Not including exhibits and appendices, the report was 130 pages 
long.60  In sum, Allen’s report found “no price impact from any of  the 
[EPJ Fund’s] alleged misrepresentations.”61  The report divided these 
alleged misrepresentations into three categories: (1) “[c]ost savings from 
Halliburton’s merger with Dresser Industries,” (2) “[a]ccounting for 
unapproved claims on fixed-price construction contracts,” and (3) 
“[r]eporting of  asbestos liability arising out of  Halliburton’s exposure to 
asbestos claims.”62  To explain why the alleged misrepresentations had no 
impact on price, she used detailed graphs, tables, and timelines.63 
                                            
reasonably be inferred from a highly unusual price movement that occurs immediately 
after an event and has no other potential causes.”). 
54 Export Report of  Lucy P. Allen, Archdiocese of  Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Event 
Study] (subsequent history omitted). 
55 Id. at 7. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 8. 
60 Id. at 136. 
61 Id. at 8. 
62 Id. at 9–10. 
63 E.g., id. at 11, 25, 29, 50, 84, 111, 116, 125. 
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First, the EPJ Fund alleged that Halliburton “falsely stated that 
cost savings from the merger [with Dresser Industries] were expected to 
be approximately $500 million.”64  Later, as the EPJ Fund alleged, “the 
truth about the cost savings from the merger was revealed to the market 
over a series of  partial corrective disclosures, causing the stock to 
decline.”65  None of  these partial corrective disclosures, however, revealed 
“new information regarding the cost savings from the merger.”66  In sum, 
“there was no statistically significant price reaction after any of  the alleged 
misrepresentations.”67 
Second, the EPJ Fund alleged that Halliburton used “unapproved 
claims for cost overruns on fixed-price construction contracts to increase 
revenues and inflate the value of  its stock.”68  Later, as the EPJ Fund 
alleged, “the truth behind [Halliburton’s] accounting for unapproved 
claims was revealed to the market in a series of  alleged corrective 
disclosures, causing the stock price to decline.”69  All of  these alleged 
corrective disclosures, however, “were not, in fact, corrective of  any 
alleged misrepresentation regarding accounting for unapproved claims.”70  
In sum, “there was no statistically significant price reaction after any of  
these alleged misrepresentations (before and after adjusting for multiple 
comparisons).”71 
Third, the EPJ Fund “allege[d] 25 dates on which Halliburton 
allegedly misrepresented its reported asbestos liability.”72  Later, as the EPJ 
                                            
64 Id. at 24. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 27. These were the six alleged corrective disclosures: (1) “Halliburton announced 
sale of  Dresser joint ventures and lower-than-expected 3Q99 earnings”; (2) “Merrill 
Lynch and Brown Brothers Harriman reduced their earnings per share estimates”; (3) 
Halliburton announced it planned to restructure its [Engineering & Construction (E&C)] 
segment by combining its E&C businesses into one entity”; (4) Halliburton announced a 
general negative near-term outlook, E&C restructuring, and a total $120 million after-tax 
charge related to the E&C restructuring and project losses”; (5) “Alleged continuation of  
12/21/00 alleged corrective disclosure”; and (6) “Halliburton announced a $193 million 
pre-tax charge related to the E&C restructuring and project losses.” Id. 
67 Id. at 25. 
68 Id. at 52. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 55. These six alleged corrective disclosures were the same alleged corrective 
disclosures as those in the first category of  alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 27, 54–55. 
71 Id. at 53. 
72 Id. at 70. 
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Fund alleged, Halliburton made “seven partial corrective disclosures . . . 
regarding asbestos liability.”73  Finally, however, “after making the 
appropriate adjustment for multiple comparisons, there was no statistically 
significant price reaction after any of  the alleged misrepresentations.”74 
To draw these conclusions, the report “used a statistical analysis 
called a regression.”75  Sir Francis Galton, half-cousin of  Charles Darwin, 
coined the term “regression” in 1886.76 
Galton discovered that the average heights of  fathers and sons are 
linked by a regression equation.  He also uncovered an interesting 
implication of  this particular regression model . . . parents who are taller 
than average will have children who are not quite as tall, while parents who 
are shorter than average will have children who are a bit taller. . . . 
. . . Today, we call this property “regression to the mean.” 
Regression to the mean is not a causal relationship. Rather, 
it’s a statistical property of  correlated pairs of  variables like 
the heights of  fathers and sons.  Although fathers’ and 
sons’ heights are never exactly the same, their frequency 
distributions are essentially unchanging. This distributional 
stability generates the Galton regression.77 
Regression is a tool that “can have much of  the causality-revealing 
power of  a real experiment.”78  But presenting a statistical regression 
                                            
73 Id. at 71. These were the seven alleged corrective disclosures: (1) “Halliburton disclosed 
that Harbison Walker had asked for financial and asbestos claims management 
assistance”; (2) “Halliburton’s 2Q01 10-Q states that its reported net liability for known 
open asbestos claims is $124 million”; (3) “Halliburton announced $21.3 million 
Mississippi verdict”; (4) “Alleged continuation of  10/30/01 alleged corrective 
disclosure”; (5) “Halliburton announced Texas judgments”; (6) “Alleged continuation of  
12/4/01 alleged corrective disclosure”; and (7) “Halliburton announced $30 million 
Maryland verdict.” Id. at 71–72. 
74 Id. at 73. 
75 Id. at 19. 
76 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MASTERING ’METRICS: THE PATH 
FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT 79 (2015). See generally Francis Galton, Regression Towards 
Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature, 15 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 246 (1886). 
77 ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 76, at 80. 
78 Id. at 47. 
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analysis in an event study is not without its problems.79  In brief, reasonable 
people may disagree about the ability of  an event study to prove the 
absence of  price impact from alleged misrepresentations. 
So should a defendant be allowed to use an event study at the class 
certification stage to show that an alleged misrepresentation failed to 
affect the market price of  the stock? The Supreme Court said yes,80 and it 
made the right decision.  The United States of  America was founded with 
a goal of  establishing equality.81  To help ensure equality, the Supreme 
Court made the right decision.  If  plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption 
in class action litigation, defendants ought to be afforded the opportunity 
to rebut that presumption with direct price impact evidence. 
                                            
79 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Future of  Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 96 (2015) (“The standard event study used in 
securities litigation only shows the absence of  a statistically significant price impact, not the 
absence of  price impact. The difference is critical.”); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of  Event Studies in Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 188 (2009) (“[R]equiring an event study at the 
initial stages of  the plaintiffs’ case takes fact questions regarding materiality, reliance, 
causation and damages from the province of  the jury in contravention of  the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. Additionally, it imposes an unjustifiable barrier to 
meritorious claims inconsistent with the language of  the securities laws. Moreover, any 
requirement that an expert be called to present a statistical regression analysis to establish 
materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages is inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the federal securities laws.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). 
81 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001) (“There are strong minds in every walk of  life, that will rise 
superior to the disadvantages of  situation, and will command the tribute due to their 
merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society 
in general. The door ought to be equally open to all . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 
413 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“And if  it 
be a just principle, that every government ought to possess the means of  executing its own 
provisions, by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of  
that equality of  privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of  the union will be 
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside . . . .”); cf. The Federalist Papers, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2018) (“The Federalist Papers are considered one of  the most important sources 
for interpreting and understanding the original intent of  the Constitution.”) 
